By: Ibrahim Muse
Recently, certain politicians and officials from the Puntland region, including former president Abdiweli Gaas, have been spreading baseless accusations claiming that Somaliland has connections with the Islamic State operating in the mountainous Bari region of Puntland. These allegations are entirely unfounded and lack credible evidence. It appears that Puntland is attempting to deflect attention from its own documented ties with the Islamic State and the groupโs activities within its territory, including the free operation of the Islamic State through Puntland’s ports, such as Bosaso.
In reality, credible reports and evidence from sources such as the United Nations, international terrorism monitoring groups, and independent researchers reveal that the Islamic State operates freely in Puntland, generating significant revenueโestimated at nearly $6 million annuallyโthrough taxes and other means.
This article aims to debunk Puntlandโs claims and expose the deep and intertwined connections between Puntland and the Islamic State. By presenting verified findings and concrete reports, we will shed light on how the group has been able to sustain itself within Puntland, including the exploitation of its ports and financial networks.
In recent months, the Puntland authorities have launched what they call the โHillaac Operationโ against the Islamic State (ISIS) operating within their borders. However, many observers have expressed skepticism regarding the sincerity of this initiative, with claims that the operation is merely a faรงade designed to attract international funding. Despite the operationโs announcement, ISIS continues to operate openly within Puntland, especially in the regionโs ports, including Bosasoโthe economic heart of the semi-autonomous region. These concerns are compounded by Puntlandโs fractured relationship with the Somali Federal Government, leaving the region desperate for financial support from foreign powers. Puntlandโs administration has long been accused of playing a โcatch and releaseโ game with terrorist operatives. This is not an accusation taken lightly by the international community. In 2016, the United Nations Monitoring Group documented cases where individuals arrested for links to terrorist organizations, such as Al-Shabaab, were released as part of a larger amnesty program instituted by then-President Abdiweli Mohamed Ali โGass.โ This policy of leniency for suspected terrorists is well-established, and it continues to raise questions about Puntlandโs true stance on combating terrorism.
๐๐ก๐ ๐๐ฅ๐๐ง๐ฌ ๐๐ง๐ ๐ญ๐ก๐ ๐ ๐ข๐ง๐๐ง๐๐ข๐ง๐ ๐จ๐ ๐๐๐ซ๐ซ๐จ๐ซ๐ข๐ฌ๐ฆ
The clan dynamics in Puntland play a crucial role in the regionโs relationship with terrorist organizations, particularly ISIS. The leadership of ISIS-Somalia, the affiliate of the Islamic State in the Horn of Africa, is composed primarily of members from the Cali Saleebaan sub-clan, which is part of the larger Majeerteen clan. This groupโs primary financial income comes from extorting businesses in Puntland, particularly those operating within the bustling port city of Bosaso. According to reports, ISIS-Somalia has managed to generate over $6 million since 2022 by taxing local traders and businesses, especially those involved in the export of small quantities of gold from the Bari region.
The tax system imposed by ISIS in Puntland is a heavy burden on local businesses. The regionโs ports, such as Bosaso, are vital for trade, and ISIS has long maintained a stranglehold on the local economy by demanding extortionate taxes from traders. Local businessmen, especially in Bosasoโs markets, have been forced to comply with the groupโs demands to avoid retaliation. As one frankincense trader pointed out in a recent interview with VICE News, ISIS and Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State collect more taxes from local businesses than the Puntland government itself. This financial model has allowed ISIS to expand its operations in Puntland, especially in areas such as the Golis mountain range, which serves as a stronghold for the group. The control of these strategic locations has given ISIS the ability to extend its influence across Puntland, ensuring its grip on local commerce and facilitating its broader objectives in Somalia. ISIS-Somalia sustains itself financially through a combination of illicit taxation and natural resource exploitation. Reports indicate that the group has accumulated over $6 million since 2022 through:
โข Taxing businesses and traders at Bosaso Port
โข Extorting gold miners in the Bari region
These funds are used to support the groupโs operations, including recruitment, training, and logistical operations. The steady flow of income from these sources has allowed ISIS-Somalia to maintain its presence in Puntland and expand its influence.
๐๐ฅ๐๐ง ๐๐ฒ๐ง๐๐ฆ๐ข๐๐ฌ ๐๐ง๐ ๐๐ฌ๐ฅ๐๐ฆ๐ข๐ ๐๐ญ๐๐ญ๐ ๐ข๐ง ๐๐ฎ๐ง๐ญ๐ฅ๐๐ง๐
ย The Islamic State terrorists soldiers and leadership are predominantly drawn from the Cali Saleebaan, a small sub-clan of the Darod/Majeerteen. โThis sub-clan harbors grievances over the governing arrangements in Puntland, where their rivals, particularly the Mohamud Saleebaan, hold the most influence. These tensions have repeatedly flared between the Cali Saleebaan and Mohamud Saleebaan. In 2016, one such dispute escalated into an armed resistance campaign by the Cali Saleebaan, which only subsided when Puntland authorities promised to allocate more government positions to their members.
โ Crisis Group. Puntlandโs political landscape is heavily shaped by clan rivalries, with the Cali Saleebaan sub-clan of the Majeerteen playing a central role in the leadership of ISIS-Somalia. The groupโs founder, Abdulqadir Muumin Yusuf, and many of its senior members, including Mahad Macalin Jajab, hail from this clan. The Cali Saleebaan clan has historically felt marginalized by the dominance of the Mohamud Saleebaan clan in Puntlandโs governance. This political exclusion has contributed to the rise of ISIS-Somalia, as members of the Cali Saleebaan find common cause with the group. In 2016, tensions between the two clans escalated into an armed resistance campaign, which subsided only after the Puntland government promised more political representation for the Cali Saleebaan. Today, the leadership of ISIS-Somalia, including the head of the group Cabdiqani Luqmaan is primarily composed of fighters from Cali Saleebaan sub-clan, further intertwining Puntlandโs clan politics with the regionโs militant activities.
๐ ๐ฎ๐ซ๐ญ๐ก๐๐ซ ๐๐ญ๐ซ๐ฎ๐๐ญ๐ฎ๐ซ๐ ๐จ๐ ๐ญ๐ก๐ ๐๐ฌ๐ฅ๐๐ฆ๐ข๐ ๐๐ญ๐๐ญ๐ ๐ข๐ง ๐๐จ๐ฆ๐๐ฅ๐ข๐ ๐๐ง๐ ๐๐ฅ๐๐ง ๐๐ฒ๐ง๐๐ฆ๐ข๐๐ฌ ๐ข๐ง ๐ญ๐ก๐๐ข๐ซ ๐ฅ๐๐๐๐๐ซ๐ฌ๐ก๐ข๐ฉ
1: Abdulqadir Muumin Yusuf (Majeerteen, Cali Saleebaan): Founder and father of ISIS-Somalia, and the groupโs Emir for East and Central Africa. A former UK resident, Muumin returned to Somalia in 2010 and initially joined Al-Shabaab. In 2015, he split from Al-Shabaab to establish ISIS-Somalia.
2: Mahad Macalin Jajab (Majeerteen, Cali Saleebaan): Known as โCaaw Geelleโ within the group, he has served as the deputy Emir and head of ISIS-Somaliaโs propaganda wing. In 2018, he was designated a global terrorist by the U.S. for smuggling fighters and weapons into Somalia.
3: Abdirahman Faahiye Ciise (Harti, Dashiishe): Also known as โAhmed Adanโ and โKhalid,โ Faahiye has been a top commander and deputy Emir of ISIS-Somalia. He is suspected to be the current Emir following Abdulqadir Muuminโs promotion to regional leadership.
4: Abuu Yusuf (Majeerteen): Head of ISIS-Somaliaโs foreign fighters. He is a U.S. citizen who previously lived in America before joining the group.
5: Cabdixakiin Dhoqob (Majeerteen, Cali Saleebaan): Former head of ISIS-Somaliaโs political affairs. He was killed in a U.S. airstrike in Bari, leaving his successor unknown.
6: Cabdiqani Luqmaan (Majeerteen, Cali Saleebaan): Chief of military operations. Some reports suggest he might belong to the Leelkase sub-clan instead of Harti.
7: Jacfar Dabaashaan (Majeerteen, Cismaan Maxamuud): Senior figure within the group, with significant operational responsibilities.
The Cali Saleebaan sub-clan, which dominates ISIS-Somaliaโs leadership, harbors deep grievances over its perceived marginalization by Puntlandโs government, which is dominated by rival clans, particularly the Mohamud Saleebaan. This dynamic complicates efforts to defeat the group, as it often finds support in the areas it inhabits. Many residents from the same clan feel marginalized and harbor grievances against Puntlandโs dominant Mohamud Saleebaan clan, leading to a sense of alignment with the group.
๐๐ ๐๐ ๐๐๐ฉ๐จ๐ซ๐ญ: ๐๐ฑ๐ฉ๐จ๐ฌ๐ข๐ง๐ ๐ญ๐ก๐ ๐ ๐๐๐ข๐ฅ๐ข๐ญ๐๐ญ๐จ๐ซ๐ฌ ๐จ๐ ๐๐๐ซ๐ซ๐จ๐ซ๐ข๐ฌ๐ญ ๐ ๐ข๐ง๐๐ง๐๐ข๐ง๐
The U.S. Department of the Treasuryโs Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) released a report detailing individuals who facilitate the financing of terrorist organizations such as Al-Shabaab and ISIS. These individuals, primarily based in Puntland, Somalia, are actively involved in illegal arms trafficking and have significant business ties to these extremist groups. According to the report, eight individuals from Puntland have been named as key players in this network, serving as suppliers of arms and logistical support to Al-Shabaab and ISIS in Somalia.
๐๐๐ฒ ๐๐ง๐๐ข๐ฏ๐ข๐๐ฎ๐๐ฅ๐ฌ ๐๐ง๐ ๐๐๐ญ๐ข๐ฏ๐ข๐ญ๐ข๐๐ฌ ๐ข๐ง ๐๐ฎ๐ง๐ญ๐ฅ๐๐ง๐.
1. Liibaan Yuusuf Maxamed
- ย A senior operative of Al-Shabaab, responsible for security and kidnappings.ย
- Owns Liibaan General Trading Co., which is implicated in facilitating arms for Al-Shabaab.ย
2. Cabdiraxmaan Maxamed Cumar
- Member of ISIS-Somalia and a key arms trafficker operating between Yemen and Somalia. โข Involved in over $2 million in illegal arms trade between 2020 and 2024.ย
3. Mahad Ciise Aadan
- ย Smuggler linked to multiple illegal arms trade networks in Puntland.
- ย Supplied arms to both ISIS-Somalia and Al-Shabaab, moving nearly $800,000 worth of arms between 2015 and 2020.ย
4. Ciise Maxamuud Yuusuf
- Facilitator of arms and logistics for ISIS-Somalia in Puntlandโs Bari region.
5. Cabdiraxmaan Faahiye Ciise Maxamuud
- ย Senior ISIS-Somalia operative who coordinated suicide bombings, including the 2017 attack in Bosaso.ย
6. Axmed Xaaji Cali Xaaji Cumar
- ย Key leader of ISIS-Somaliaโs arms smuggling operations in Puntland, playing a critical role in ISIS-Somaliaโs leadership structure.ย
The report highlights how Puntland has become a hub for these activities, raising questions about the regionโs role in enabling terrorist financing and arms trade. The networks operating between Puntland, Yemen, and Somalia have close ties with Al-Qaeda, further exacerbating the issue. The international community is well aware of these networks, as highlighted in the OFAC report. The continued operation of these arms traffickers in Puntland underscores the regionโs role as a critical enabler of terrorism in the Horn of Africa. The evidence outlined in the OFAC report points to Puntland as a significant source of support for terrorist organizations like Al-Shabaab and ISIS. These networks, operating with apparent impunity, facilitate the arms trade and logistical support that sustain these extremist groups, underscoring the regionโs complicity in perpetuating terrorism. This is not only a regional issue but a global security concern. Interestingly Abdiweli Mohamed Yusuf the head of the finance office of the Somalia-based affiliate of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), sanctioned by the U.S. Department of the Treasuryโs Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is a former Minister from Puntland during @aliabdiweli. Another clear example of the intersection between clan politics and the influence of the Islamic State: prolific OFAC-designated arms trafficker and Al-Shabaab affiliate Ahmed Mataan has been installed as the leader (Beeldaaje) of his sub-clan during a ceremony in Bosaso, Puntland.
๐๐ก๐ ๐๐ซ๐ฆ๐ฌ ๐๐ฆ๐ฎ๐ ๐ ๐ฅ๐ข๐ง๐ ๐๐๐ฑ๐ฎ๐ฌ: ๐๐จ๐ฌ๐๐ฌ๐จ ๐๐จ๐ซ๐ญโ๐ฌ ๐๐จ๐ฅ๐ ๐ข๐ง ๐๐ซ๐ฆ๐ข๐ง๐ ๐๐ฑ๐ญ๐ซ๐๐ฆ๐ข๐ฌ๐ญ๐ฌย
Puntlandโs ports, particularly Bosaso, have become central to the regionโs illicit activities, including arms trafficking. The portโs location along the Gulf of Aden makes it an ideal conduit for the illegal trade of weapons and ammunition. Recent reports indicate that vessels from Yemen frequently dock in Bosaso to offload weapons, which are then distributed to extremist groups operating in the region, including ISIS.
Bosaso Port, located along the Gulf of Aden, plays a dual role in Puntlandโs economy. While it facilitates legal commerce, it is also a key point for arms smuggling, particularly from Yemen, that sustains groups like ISIS-Somalia and Al-Shabaab. Vessels traveling from Yemen, often linked to the regionโs ongoing conflict, transport weapons and ammunition to Bosaso, where they are redistributed to these militant groups.
The Marwan 1, a vessel previously associated with the โSomali 7โ fleet, exemplifies the scale of this illicit trade. On December 1, 2022, the USS Lewis B. Puller intercepted the Marwan 1 in the Gulf of Oman, discovering a large cache of arms including:
- Over 1 million rounds of 7.62mm ammunition,
- ย 25,000 rounds of 12.7mm ammunition,ย
- ย 7,000 rocket proximity fuses, andย
- 2,100 kilograms of RPG propellant.ย
The documentation below confirms that the arms-trafficking vessel is registered in #Somalia, with the owners (Somlink Fisheries).This interception highlighted how Puntland ports like Bosaso facilitate the flow of arms to extremist groups, illustrating the critical role Bosaso plays in the broader regional arms trade.
Vessels operating from Yemen and Oman frequently avoid transparency regarding their destinations. In 2022, for instance, the AK HAMBURG anchored at Bosaso without officially reporting its docking. It later engaged in ship-to-ship transfers (STS), as captured by satellite imagery, further raising concerns over the lack of accountability in port activities. This pattern of non-disclosure, exemplified by vague destination codes like โSO BOS,โ raises suspicions of deliberate efforts to obscure illicit operations.
๐๐ง ๐๐ง๐ญ๐๐ซ๐ง๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง๐๐ฅ ๐๐๐๐ฎ๐ซ๐ข๐ญ๐ฒ ๐๐จ๐ง๐๐๐ซ๐ง
The implications of Puntlandโs role in facilitating terrorism reach far beyond Somalia. The U.S. Department of the Treasuryโs Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has issued sanctions against individuals involved in the arms trade and logistics supporting ISIS and Al-Shabaab in the region. These individuals, many of whom are based in Puntland, have played an instrumental role in smuggling weapons and providing logistical support to terrorist groups.
Puntlandโs strategic importance in the global fight against terrorism cannot be overstated. The regionโs ports serve as gateways for arms trafficking, and its clan dynamics provide fertile ground for extremist ideologies to take root. Despite the Puntland governmentโs claim to be taking action against ISIS, the groupโs continued operations in the region, coupled with the governmentโs lenient stance toward militants, suggest that Puntland has become a key enabler of terrorism in the Horn of Africa.
The international community must confront this issue head-on, demanding accountability from Puntlandโs leaders and urging them to cut off the financial and logistical support that allows groups like ISIS to flourish. Until then, the region will likely remain a haven for terrorism, with devastating consequences for both Somalia and the broader Horn of Africa.
๐๐จ๐ฆ๐๐ฅ๐ข๐ฅ๐๐ง๐ ๐ฏ๐ฌ. ๐๐ฎ๐ง๐ญ๐ฅ๐๐ง๐: ๐ ๐๐๐ฅ๐ ๐จ๐ ๐๐จ๐ฎ๐ง๐ญ๐๐ซ๐ญ๐๐ซ๐ซ๐จ๐ซ๐ข๐ฌ๐ฆ ๐๐ญ๐ซ๐๐ญ๐๐ ๐ข๐๐ฌ ๐๐ง๐ ๐ญ๐ก๐ ๐๐ก๐ซ๐๐๐ญ ๐๐ซ๐จ๐ฆ ๐๐๐๐ ๐๐ง๐ ๐๐ฅ-๐๐ก๐๐๐๐๐
While Puntland has become a haven for terrorist groups such as ISIS, which has established a stronghold in the regionโs ports and exploited clan dynamics for financial gain, Somaliland stands in stark contrast with its robust approach to counterterrorism. The unrecognized republic of Somaliland has successfully kept terrorist groups like Al-Shabaab from gaining a significant foothold within its borders. Unlike Puntland, where ISIS operates with apparent impunity, Somaliland has maintained strict control over its territory, especially in its key cities such as Hargeisa, and has thwarted numerous attempts by Al-Shabaab to infiltrate the region.
Al-Shabaabโs and Islamic Stateโs inability to establish an enduring presence in Somaliland is due to several key factors. First and foremost, the government of Somaliland has implemented effective, locally-driven governance, ensuring broad community support and establishing a network of local intelligence. This intelligence network, both formal and informal, serves as a vital force multiplier in Somalilandโs fight against extremism. The creation of the Special Protection Unit (SPU) and a dedicated counterterrorism force, supported by training from the UK, bolstered by local community engagement, has allowed Somaliland to remain relatively stable.
๐๐จ๐ฆ๐๐ฅ๐ข๐ฅ๐๐ง๐โ๐ฌ ๐๐ฎ๐๐๐๐ฌ๐ฌ ๐ข๐ง ๐๐ซ๐๐ฏ๐๐ง๐ญ๐ข๐ง๐ ๐๐ฅ-๐๐ก๐๐๐๐๐ ๐๐ง๐ ๐๐ฌ๐ฅ๐๐ฆ๐ข๐ ๐๐ญ๐๐ญ๐
Despite suffering from attacks in the past, such as the 2008 coordinated bombings, Somaliland has continued to strengthen its security capabilities. The governmentโs focus on human intelligence (HUMINT) has been a cornerstone of its success. By integrating local communities into the security efforts and fostering trust, Somaliland has been able to detect and thwart Al-Shabaabโs plans. This proactive approach has allowed the government to prevent at least three major terrorist attacks by the group in recent years.
In addition to its Human Intelligence HUMINT-based counterterrorism strategy, Somalilandโs security forces have been able to thwart piracy, a related form of extremism, using community-based monitoring along the coastline. This citizen-driven approach to security has proven effective and could serve as a model for combating other forms of insurgency.
๐๐ก๐ ๐๐ซ๐จ๐ฐ๐ข๐ง๐ ๐๐ก๐ซ๐๐๐ญ ๐จ๐ ๐๐ฎ๐ง๐ญ๐ฅ๐๐ง๐ ๐ญ๐จ ๐๐จ๐ฆ๐๐ฅ๐ข๐ฅ๐๐ง๐โ๐ฌ ๐๐๐๐ฎ๐ซ๐ข๐ญ๐ฒ
While Somaliland has successfully fought Al-Shabaab within its borders, the growing presence of ISIS in neighboring Puntland poses a significant threat. Puntlandโs ports, particularly Bosaso, have become critical hubs for ISIS operations, where the group finances its activities through extortion of local businesses. The tax system imposed by ISIS in Puntland is a major factor enabling their persistence in the region, while Puntlandโs lenient stance on terrorism exacerbates the situation. Puntlandโs cooperation with terrorist groups and its use of ports to facilitate arms trafficking have wider security implications for the Horn of Africa, with Somaliland and Ethiopia particularly vulnerable to spillover effects.
Somalilandโs borders, particularly the Cal Madaw Mountains and the eastern regions near the Puntland border, are the most susceptible to infiltration from groups like ISIS and Al-Shabaab. Given the porous nature of these borderlands and the limited governance in some areas, terrorist groups have been able to fund madrassas, build relationships with vulnerable communities, and sow discord. The presence of ISIS in Puntland also complicates Somalilandโs security efforts, as terrorist elements can easily operate across the border.
๐๐ก๐ ๐๐จ๐ฅ๐ ๐จ๐ ๐๐ง๐ญ๐๐ซ๐ง๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง๐๐ฅ ๐๐๐๐จ๐ ๐ง๐ข๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง ๐ข๐ง ๐๐ง๐ก๐๐ง๐๐ข๐ง๐ ๐๐จ๐ฎ๐ง๐ญ๐๐ซ๐ญ๐๐ซ๐ซ๐จ๐ซ๐ข๐ฌ๐ฆ ๐๐๐๐จ๐ซ๐ญ๐ฌ
Somalilandโs capacity to combat terrorism in the region would be significantly enhanced if the international community recognized its sovereignty. Despite its achievements in governance and security, Somaliland faces considerable challenges due to its lack of international recognition. It struggles to receive aid or access to resources that could improve its military, intelligence services, and infrastructure. Recognition would not only bolster Somalilandโs financial capacity but also strengthen its counterterrorism efforts by providing more substantial international support.
Somalilandโs anti-terrorism efforts are hampered by its isolation in the international arena. While countries like the UK and the EU provide some aid and training, they are limited in their ability to offer substantial assistance due to Somalilandโs lack of formal recognition. Without international recognition, Somaliland cannot fully leverage its strategic position in the fight against extremism in the Horn of Africa.
๐๐ก๐ ๐๐๐๐ ๐๐จ๐ซ ๐๐ง๐๐ซ๐๐๐ฌ๐๐ ๐๐ง๐ญ๐๐ซ๐ง๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง๐๐ฅ ๐๐ฎ๐ฉ๐ฉ๐จ๐ซ๐ญ
The international community must recognize Somalilandโs efforts to combat terrorism and offer more robust support. Somaliland has proven that it can govern effectively and combat terrorist groups using locally derived intelligence and community-driven initiatives. However, to continue this fight, especially against the growing threat from Puntlandโs links with ISIS, Somaliland needs more resources, training, and international cooperation. By recognizing Somalilandโs sovereignty, the global community would provide the necessary tools for Somaliland to secure its borders and continue its counterterrorism efforts against groups like Al-Shabaab and ISIS.
In conclusion, while Puntland remains a hotbed for terrorism and a potential source of instability in the Horn of Africa, Somaliland has demonstrated a much more effective strategy in combating terrorist groups. With the right international support and recognition, Somaliland could become an even more powerful force in the fight against extremism, not only in the Horn of Africa but also in the wider global effort to combat terrorism.
Citations
[1] Courtney Kube, โGlobal leader of ISIS targeted and possibly killed in U.S. airstrike,โ NBC News, June 15, 2024.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Carla Babb, Harun Maruf, and Jeff Seldin, โIslamic State in Somalia poses growing threat, US officials say,โ Voice of America, June 18, 2024.
[4] Jeff Seldin, โUS watching #ISIS-#Somalia closely, per @USAfricaCommandโs Gen. Michael Langley โฆ,โ X, June 27, 2024.
[5] Author (Weiss) interview, Somali security source, Kampala, Uganda, July 2024; โSource: ISIS leader Abdulqadir Mumin survives U.S. airstrike in Somalia,โ Hiraan Online, July 10, 2024.
[6] Jason Warner and Caleb Weiss, โA Legitimate Challenger? Assessing the Rivalry between al-Shabaab and the Islamic State in Somalia,โ CTC Sentinel 10:10 (2017).
[7] Ibid.; Caleb Weiss, โJihadi archives: Islamic Stateโs eulogy of Sudanese jihadist Mohamad Makkawi Ibrahim,โ FDDโs Long War Journal, July 5, 2024.
[8] Based on authorโs (Weiss) own compilation of Islamic State-Somalia attack data.
[9] Jay Bahadur, Former UN Sanctions Monitor, 29 May, 2023
[10] U.S. Seizes 1.1 Million Rounds of Ammunition, Other Illegal Weapons in Gulf of Oman, 03 December, 2022.
[11] Treasury Sanctions Terrorist Weapons Trafficking Network in Eastern Africa, 01 November, 2022
About the Author
Ibrahim Muse ,is a political analyst and economist with a focus on politics, democracy , human rights, and diplomacy.
Twitter (X): @IbraM2035
The views expressed in this article are the authorโs own and do not necessarily reflect the Horndiplomat editorial policy.
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